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ABSTRACT 
 
This article studies the impact of reputation on market entry in public procurement. Based on the observation of a 
French firm with a strong reputation, we demonstrate a significant effect of the difference in public contracts won 
between date t-1 and date t. Our model provides empirical proof that selection of a supplier with a strong reputation 
does not hinder entry in public procurement nor does it prevent free competition. This result thus questions the 
justification for the European Union regulation that limits the use of information on past performance to select 
suppliers in public markets. The findings also suggest that reputation mechanisms can help reduce uncertainty 
during contract execution.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
everal studies show that reputation influences firm performance (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Landon 
and Smith, 1997; Roberts and Dowling, 2002; Stuebs and Sun, 2009). This performance also raises the 
problem of the role of reputation in market access. Specifically, does the strong reputation of a firm create 
a barrier to market entry for other firms?  
 
To understand the impact of reputation, we concentrated on public markets. In 2011, public markets in Europe 
represented over €2 billion, or nearly 19% of GDP. In fact, the efficiency of public procurement has often been 
questioned. The supplier selection phase, particularly regarding contract awarding criteria, has been discussed 
extensively. Information asymmetry complicates the choice of supplier for a public buyer, and makes it difficult to 
foresee behaviour during contract execution.  
 
It would be logical to think that a firm’s reputation creates an advantage that may dissuade, hinder, decrease or delay 
access to a market for other firms. In economics, entry barriers play an important role in many subjects related to 
competition.  
 
However, to reduce opportunistic behaviour by some suppliers, notably in complex contracts, public buyers may be 
tempted to use reputation as a selection criterion in awarding public contracts. Reputation, measured by past 
performance, allows more efficient coordination of trade (Hart and Moore, 1999), reduced transactions costs 
(Williamson, 1985; Yukins, 2008) and management of contractual incompleteness (Tirole, 1999). 
 
The relation among reputation, competition and entry barriers has been an important topic in the debate on 
regulation of public procurement (European Commission, 2011).  
 
Consequently, the selection criterion of past performance can be both an incentive measure to increase the quality of 
tenders and an entry barrier for new suppliers. Further, Spagnolo (2012) demonstrates that reputational mechanisms 
can be designed to stimulate rather than hinder new entry.  
 
The objective of this study is therefore to determine the extent that a firm’s reputation affects the awarding of public 
contracts. Specifically, we investigate whether mechanisms based on evaluation of past performance can improve 
governance of public contracting in Europe.  
S 
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To make an original contribution, we observe the awarding of French public contracts over a six-year period. We 
perform a longitudinal analysis of past performance of the firm with the strongest reputation by applying the first-
order Signed INteger-valued AutoRegressive model (SINAR). The estimates produced by the model demonstrate 
the weight of the impact of reputation in public procurement. The main contribution of this empirical study is that it 
shows that selection of a supplier in public markets based on reputation does not necessarily create an entry barrier 
for public contracts and does not impede free competition.   
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First we present the theoretical foundations of reputation in 
public markets and the concept of entry barrier. Second, we describe the data used in the empirical study. Lastly, we 
propose, test and define the parameters of a model of reputation. The last section of the article provides a discussion 
and some recommendations.   
 
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
2.1 Awarding Public Procurement Contracts 
 
In France, the Code des Marchés Publics (Public Procurement Contracts Code - PPCC, 2012), inspired by European 
directives (European Parliament, 2004), sets the legal framework for public procurement (Gelderman et al., 2006). 
Public procurement is defined as a contract concluded, in return for payment, between a public contractor and a 
private economic operator. The purpose of the contract is to satisfy needs in works, goods or services (PPCC, 2012). 
 
For public powers, the quest for the lowest purchasing costs is a fundamental objective (Loader, 2010), and 
promoting competitive tendering among suppliers is a means long used to lower these costs, particularly through 
calls for tenders (Arlbjørn & Freytag, 2012). In the French context, suppliers engage in a procedure of competitive 
tendering, after which the most economically advantageous bid is retained (PPCC, 2012). Competitive tendering 
procedures are part of a logic aimed at maximally reducing collusion between the public sector and private firms, 
and at avoiding favouring one candidate over another. To make the best choice, public buyers use the following 
criteria: quality, price, technical value, aesthetic and functional character, performance in environmental protection, 
performance in professional integration of persons excluded from the labour market, global usage costs, 
innovativeness, after-sale service and technical assistance, delivery date, delivery time and execution time (PPCC, 
2012). However, purchasers can also ask suppliers to provide information that would let them assess their 
experience, or their technical, professional or financial capacity.   
 
Unlike in the private sector, however, public procurement entails very formal contracts subject to major 
administrative constraints (Arlbjørn & Freytag, 2012). Public buyers therefore face two main difficulties in contract 
management, regardless of the contract phase (selection, monitoring of execution, closing). First, the public buyer 
cannot directly observe the supplier’s performance (information asymmetry). Second, it cannot foresee all the 
contingencies that will affect the contract during its execution (contractual incompleteness). 
 
2.2  Contractual Incompleteness 
 
As Saussier and Tirole (2015) maintain, contract management is characterised by numerous risks: risk of collusion 
when markets are concentrated, risk of “winner’s curse” when the best tender comes from the most optimistic 
partner rather than the most efficient one, risk of receiving overly aggressive offers from suppliers simply aiming to 
be selected, which intend to renegotiate the contract later; risk of moral hazard, where a firm that wins a contract 
with the public authorities may later, when the contract is awarded, prove to be inefficient or even inattentive at 
managing it; risk of hold up if the supplier confiscates the surplus of the transaction; risk of corruption, etc.  
 
Risksharing in public contracts is therefore essential because it determines both the level of accountability of the 
firm and its profit. The firm naturally has better knowledge of the technology available, procurement costs, and 
demand for products and services included in the public contract. Further, the costs and demand are not linked to its 
decisions in human resources management, choice of production capacities, research and development, service 
quality, risk management, etc. 
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Consequently, the public buyer and its supplier cannot foresee, and hence stipulate what must happen in all possible 
cases. The contracting parties cannot write a complete contract in which all characteristics are described in sufficient 
detail for a court to order their application. This information asymmetry is inherent in public procurement.   
 
As a result of information asymmetry, the public buyer will seek other means to achieve effective coordination of 
commerce (Hart and Moore, 1999). Several solutions are possible. First, contracts are generally concluded following a 
competitive process. Competitive tendering procedures are a means long used to lower purchasing costs because it 
obliges suppliers to disclose information about their cost price and margin (Loader, 2010; Arlbjørn & Freytag, 2012). 
Incentive mechanisms may also be applied, such as comparing firms’ performance with that of similar firms 
operating in different markets, or putting the offer up for auction to identify the most efficient firm. Procedures that 
create competition are also part of a logic aimed at maximally reducing collusion between the public buyer private 
firms, to avoid favouring one candidate over another, and to guarantee the integrity of the procurement process 
(Vagstad, 1995; Drabkin and al., 2005).  
 
2.3 Role of Reputation 
 
To resolve information asymmetry between the public buyer and suppliers, another alternative is to rely on trust 
(based on expectations of future behaviour) or on reputation (based on past behaviour). Asymmetry is due to the fact 
that public procurement contracts are incomplete because they do not allow public buyers to address the 
unforeseeability of tasks to perform. Contractual incompleteness is explained by the unverifiability of characteristics 
by a third party and by the indescribability of future contingencies (Maskin and Tirole, 1999; Tirole, 1999). 
 
This is why, in contracts with great uncertainty, reputation becomes a signal of the good quality of a firm’s products 
or services (Shapiro, 1983). Podolny and Phillips (1996) maintain that “reputation is determined by the value 
(quality) of the actor’s previous efforts.” A strong reputation provides several advantages. Notably, it can reduce 
transaction costs because the partners are less concerned with contractual risks (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Roberts 
and Dowling, 2002). It also improves the perception and impact of the commercial offer (Dowling, 2001). It 
encourages suppliers to respect their commitments and thus deserve the buyer’s trust (Milgrom and Roberts, 1988). 
In addition, it encourages ethical behaviour (Sacconi, 2007). 
 
As Fombrun (1996) contends, reputation is “a perceptual representation of a company’s past actions and future 
prospects.”  This view is confirmed by empirical studies that demonstrate a positive relationship between firm 
reputation and performance (Fombrun, and Shanley, 1990; Landon and Smith, 1997; Roberts and Dowling, 2002; 
Stuebs and Sun, 2009). 
 
However, Spagnolo (2012) notes that the use of reputation as a supplier selection criterion is widespread in the 
private sector, unlike in the public sector. In the public sector, the need to avoid favouritism and corruption have led 
legislators to encourage contract awarding procedures that are open and transparent, and that treat all suppliers 
equally.   
 
Yet some experiences in the public sector affirm the role of reputation in candidate selection. For example, Mamavi 
et al. (2015) prove that the supplier selection process may be influenced by the supplier’s past performance and by 
the sector of activity of the transaction. Decarolis et al. (2014) present a real experiment that provides empirical 
evidence of the effect of announcing the use of past performance information when awarding a public procurement 
contract. Lamothe and Lamothe (2012) show how local governments tend to place more confidence in their vendors’ 
faithfulness and honesty when their contracting partners have strong community ties and perform their tasks well. 
Van Slyke (2007) contends that public buyers use reputation as a sanction or reward mechanism to control supplier 
behaviour.   
 
These findings lead us to formulate our first research hypothesis:  
 
H1: The strength of a firm’s reputation has a significant effect on its ability to win public contracts.   
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2.4 Entry Barriers 
 
Consensus has not yet emerged in the academic literature regarding the definition of entry barrier. Nonetheless, 
scholars agree that this term refers to an obstacle that hinders a firm’s access to a market.  Shepherd (1979) specifies 
two categories of entry barriers. Exogenous barriers are linked to cost advantages (product quality, brand image, 
distribution circuit, research and development, etc.), whereas endogenous barriers are related to competitive 
behaviour of incumbent firms in accordance with their market strategies (competitors, price, advertising, etc.). 
Barriers affect firm strategy relative to two components: the commercial offer proposed and access to the market 
(Pehrsson, 2009). 
 
For public markets, the American Senate conducted a study that shows that past performance or the need for prior 
experience may be an obstacle to market entry for small or new firms and may hinder the ability of such firms to 
win calls for tenders (GAO, 2011). This conclusion has been confirmed by other authors. For example, Butler et 
al. (2013) argue that inappropriate reputation mechanisms may create an entry barrier to the market by limiting the 
number of candidates. In their study of public e-markets, Spagnolo and Dini (2005) show that the existence of a 
reputation mechanism favours incumbents over newcomers. The lack of information on newcomers reduces the 
possibility of interaction, discourages participation and implies fewer commercial opportunities. This generates an 
entry barrier that encourages newcomers to formulate abnormally low bids to make up for their lack of reputation. 
Mailath and Samuelson (2001) assert that a strong reputation obliges all newcomers, whose reputation is weak, to 
spend more to improve the perceived quality of their tender.   
 
This leads us to formulate our second research hypothesis:   
 
H2: A firm’s strong reputation is an entry barrier to public markets for other firms.   
 
3. DESCRIPTION OF DATA 
 
The problem with measuring firm reputation is that reputation often stems from stakeholders’ perceptions or 
evaluations. As a result, this type of measure is very volatile, and is highly contingent on stakeholders, relations and 
interests (Koronis and Ponis, 2012). This is why we have retained past performance as the main indicator of firm 
reputation (Spagnolo, 2012). 
 
To assess the impact of suppliers’ performance history on their current win performance, we have chosen to study 
the case of France. Specifically, we collected all transactions of “12981” suppliers between 2006-01-02 and 2011-
06-09, as stated in French Official Journals (www.boamp.fr). Note that throughout this period there were only 450 
days where the public sector has issued calls for tenders. Further, we selected this supplier because it obtained the 
most tenders during this period. Namely, “1298” won 1910 public procurement contracts.  Let Xt( ) denote the time 
series of daily number of contracts won by “1298.” Thus, the recorded data above are considered as observations of 
this process. Associated descriptive statistics are given in the following table:  
 
Table 1. Summary of observed daily number of contracts won by "1298" 
Minimum Median Mean Std deviation Maximum 
0 0 4.258 18.31876 138 
 
The observations of the process are displayed in Figure 1. Based on the observed data and by using the KPSS test 
(for details, see Kwiatkowski et al., 1992), one can deduce that the time series is not stationary.  In such case, we 
need to use the differencing operator to achieve stationarity. Thus, let us consider Yt( )  time series, where Yt = Xt - 
Xt−1 . Explicitly, Yt  denotes the difference between the number of contracts won by “1298” at time/day t and that of 
t-1.  
 
 
                                                
1 Supplier ID code. 
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Figure 1. Plot of observed daily number of contracts won by "1298" from 2006-01-02 to 2011-06-09 
 
Based on the original data, Figure 2 presents the observations of for the period between 2006-01-09 and 2011-06-09. 
Of course, we now have 449 observations instead of the 450 originally collected. Note that here the KPSS test shows 
that no evidence that the observed data of this new times series are not stationary.  
 
Figure 2. Plot of observed data of the process Yt( )  from 2006-01-09 to 2011-06-09 
 
 
Next, to check the quality of the chosen model to fit the data, we took the 400 initial observations of the time series 
as a learning set (i.e., to estimate the parameters of the chosen model) and use the 49 latest observations of the time 
series as a test set for forecasting.  
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4. MODEL SPECIFICATION AND RESULTS 
 
Recall that, by definition Yt( ) is an integer-valued time series. Associated descriptive statistics are given in the 
following table:  
 
Table 2. Summary of observed data of Yt( )  
Minimum Median Mean St-deviation Maximum 
-140 0 -0.0375 21.89611 145 
 
Further, the sample Auto-Correlation-Function (ACF) and sample Partial-Auto-Correlation-Function (PACF) have 
values significantly different from zero at lag 1 (see Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3. From left to right, plot of sample ACF and sample PACF of Yt( ) ,  based on the first 400 observations only 
 
 
Thus, to analyse this time series, we suggest the first-order Signed Integer-valued AutoRegressive SINAR (1) 
process:  
 𝑌" = 𝛼°𝑌"&' + 𝜀", 
 
with 
 𝛼°𝑌"&' = 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛	(𝑌"&') 𝑍3456738'  𝑝 = 𝐸(𝜀") 
 
where, for an integer 𝑥, 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑥 = 1 if 𝑥 > 0		and −1 if 𝑥 < 0, (𝑍3) a sequence of i.i.d. integer-valued random 
variables (called counting series) independent of 𝑌"&', 𝛼 = 𝐸 𝑍3 ,	and (𝜀") a sequence of i.i.d. integer-valued 
random variables, independent of the counting series (𝑍3), with 𝑝 = 𝐸(𝜀") 
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Using the conditional least squares estimator, one can obtain: 
 α = −0.43180.0451 		and  ρ = −0.00160.8200  
 
as an estimation of unknown parameters 𝛼 and 𝜌 respectively (standard errors, reported in brackets below each 
estimate). Furthermore, one can deduce, using a t-test, that 𝛼 is significantly different from zero at the 95% 
significance level. Therefore, one can say that the value of 𝑌" (the difference between the number of contracts won 
by “1298” at time/day t and that of t-1) can be explained partly due to 𝑌"&' (the difference between the number of 
contracts won by “1298” at time/day 𝑡 − 1 and that of 𝑡 − 2). In other words, the historical performances of supplier 
“1298” could explain its actual win performance. On the other hand, the one-step ahead least squares forecast 𝑌"L' 
of 𝑌"&'equals: 
 𝑌"&' = 𝛼𝑌" + 𝜌 
 
In general 𝑌"L'is real-valued. A mapping into the discrete support of the series is obtained by rounding to the nearest 
integer. Note that all values of the test set for forecasting (last 49 observations) are equal to zero. Using the one-step 
forecast defined in the above equation (and after the rounding map), one can also see that all forecasting values for 
the test set are null. This result can be explained by the fact that the observations of (𝑌") remain invariant (equal to 
zero) over a long time interval especially at the end (see Figure 2), and the estimate value of 𝜌 is sufficiently small 
for varying forecasts. 
 
Note that the SINAR (1) process used to fit our data was introduced by Kachour and Truquet (2011), who show that 
SINAR (1) has the same properties as that of the standard real-valued first-order AutoRegressive AR (1) process (for 
details on the real-valued AR (1) process, refer to Duflo (1997)). Further, unlike most integer-valued models in the 
literature, the SINAR process can deal with integer-valued time series with negative observations and negative 
autocorrelations. Therefore, this process can be used to analyse integer-valued times series that have the same 
empirical characteristics as those of an AR process. The major indicator of these attributes is often found through an 
empirical autocorrelation structure. For instance, Kachour and Truquet (2011) have used the SINAR process to 
analyse Fürth data (counts of pedestrians on a city block observed every 5 seconds) and the annual Swedish 
population rates for the century of 1750 to1849. 
 α = -0.43180.0451   ρ = -0.00160.8200  
 
5. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
Our findings validate the first hypothesis: the strength of a firm’s reputation has a significant effect on the firm’s 
ability to win public contracts. The estimation of the parameter of our model is -0.4318, which indicates that the 
possibility of the firm “1298”’s winning a contract depends significantly on its having won the previous contract.   
 
In contrast, the findings lead us to reject the second hypothesis: the strength of a firm’s reputation is a barrier to 
public market entry. Because the estimate of the parameter of our model is negative, there is a significant probability 
of 43% that firm “1298” will not win the next contract on which it tenders if it has won the previous contract.   
 
To encourage the use of reputation as criteria in awarding European public contracts process, these results therefore 
lead us to formulate the following two recommendations. 
 
5.1 Managerial Implications 
 
Given that our second hypothesis is refuted, we can conclude that the strength of a firm’s reputation does not impede 
entry in procurement. Consequently, this result supports the use of reputation mechanisms based on past 
performance, as in the case in the USA or South Korea, for example. This system can encourage firms to honour 
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their contractual commitments in that it would make information on firms’ reputation more easily accessible to 
contracting entities.   
 
Bannerjee and Duflo (2000) demonstrated the effectiveness of a ratings-based reputation mechanism in the private 
sector. In the United States, the Internet Federal Awardee Performance and Integrity Information System (FAPIIS) 
aggregates multiple sources of information (including Past Performance Information Retrieval, PPIRS, and the 
Contractor Performance System, CPS) and helps federal services in charge of procurement to select suppliers by 
providing pertinent and up-to-date information on firms’ history for the last five years. In Europe, Spagnolo (2012) 
conducted an empirical study of a large Italian public services firm that introduced an experimental rating system for 
its subcontractors and used a reputation criterion in its selection procedures. The study finds that this approach 
increased quality, and that simple rules for rating reputation can avoid favouritism and the creation of entry barriers 
for newcomers that lack past experience with the public contractor.   
 
Our results extend the works of Butler et al. (2013), who conducted a laboratory experiment in which they modelled 
the relationship between reputation and entry in procurement. They implemented a repeated procurement game with 
reputational incentives for quality and the possibility of entry. They design reputation as an incentive system to limit 
moral hazard in the quality dimension as well as on the effect of reputation on selection through entry. Their results 
suggest that while some reputational mechanisms may indeed reduce the frequency of entry besides increasing 
quality so that the concern is indeed warranted, well-designed reputational mechanisms with positive entry 
reputation need not hinder entry and may actually stimulate it. 
 
This reputation mechanism based on past performance is similar to the measures taken in the USA. Since 2005, 
when public contracts are awarded, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) requires agencies to consider firms' 
performance records to help ensure that taxpayer dollars go to capable contractors. As in the private sector, the FAR 
also gives public contracting authorities considerable power to decide how they will consider firms’ past experience 
and the quality of work executed (GAO, 2011).  
 
5.2 Legal Implications 
 
The results of this study underline the value of improving the legislative framework governing the inclusion of 
reputation in contract awarding criteria. Currently, regulation on public procurement (European Commission, 2011) 
limits the use of information on past performance in qualitative selection criteria. These directives stipulate that 
concerning technical and professional capacities: “contracting authorities may require, in particular, that economic 
operators have a sufficient level of experience demonstrated by suitable references from contracts performed in the 
past” (article 58, paragraph 4). Nonetheless, article 57 of the directive (European Parliament, 2014) foresees that 
firms may be excluded “where the economic operator has shown significant or persistent deficiencies in the 
performance of a substantive requirement under a prior public contract, a prior contract with a contracting entity 
or a prior concession contract which led to early termination of that prior contract, damages or other comparable 
sanctions.” 
 
These regulatory provisions may lead firms to honour their contractual commitments and thus avoid opportunistic 
behaviours intended to win a contract by underestimating costs. However, we recommend the reinforcement of 
negotiated procedures like “competitive procedure with negotiation,” and “competitive dialogue” (European 
Parliament, 2014). Flexibility in the use of a negotiated procedure would limit the use of calls for tenders to 
procurement of products, services or standardised work, as opposed to specific projects. As Chong et al. (2014) 
demonstrate, the selection of contracting mode is dictated less by conditions of economic efficiency then by the fear 
of being accused of favouritism. The use of negotiated procedures that can consider suppliers’ reputation is more 
effective than a call for tenders mainly in complex markets, in which proposals must include innovative conception 
or solutions (Estache et al., 2009). 
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper examined the impact of reputation on firms’ access to public procurement. Regarding supplier selection, 
our results show that reputation is a criterion used by public buyers, but it is not an obstacle that hinders, decreases 
or delays the awarding of a contract to another firm. Note that this study has one main limitation. In our model, 
information on contract execution was not considered in the estimation of the firm’s reputation. This lack of 
information is mainly due to content of the European directive for public procurement (European Parliament, 2014), 
which covers the awarding phase but virtually overlooks contract management. In fact, a supplier’s performance 
may be very different from what was promised before it was selected, and what is done once it obtains the contract. 
One of the main challenges related to increasing the efficiency of public procurement within the European Union 
would therefore be to encourage and centralise information on both contract awarding and execution.    
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